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In this symposium, the editors have assigned the commentators a
difficult task by requesting a response to Professor Levinson's speech.
Law professors, being a contentious lot, find provocation in the simplest
of statements. In this case, though, I disagree with little, if any, of
what Professor Levinson has written. Still, he does evoke a reaction, if
not a pointed response.
Professor Levinson's article of faith stands poised between mod-
ernist and postmodernist sentiments about law and contains a degree of
skepticism that I understand, share, and find uncomfortable. The mod-
ernism in Levinson's remarks, as I see it, is contained in his recognition
(and partial acceptance) of paradox and contradiction in law, and his
consequent rejection of, or agnosticism toward, legal dogma as the
Way to Truth and Justice. As I read him, Levinson's bow to
postmodernism is his desire for comfort in the existential quality of law
through belief in law's power to order political institutions. Institutions
so ordered reject dogma and allow decisions to be made in the presence
of paradox and contradiction, resulting in an array of diverse and com-
peting truth(s) and justice(s). This faith in law's ability to accommo-
date and mediate competing claims is a faith in the liberal tradition.
My discomfort stems from what I perceive to be a notable degree
of skepticism. As a writer and as a teacher, I feel an obligation to make
positive, authoritative statements about law, or at least to take recog-
nizable positions. At the same time, skepticism, not humility, pulls me
in another direction. I do not trust dogmatic assertions about law or
legal education. I am torn between the need for explicit articulation of
my beliefs and a simultaneous fear or distrust of them. This distressing
ambivalence seems pandemic to our age, as Levinson's discussion of
Metzger and Rorty makes clear. I believe that those of us afflicted with
this ambivalence cope by making a series of temporary resolutions that
serve as resting places in our personal intellectual journeys. In the
course of this essay, I want to uncover what attracts me to the liberal,
intellectual pluralism Professor Levinson describes, and I want to ex-
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plore why I cannot stay content resting within the interstices of indeter-
minacy surrounding this position.
II. THE LAW AS JUSTICE
I am a product of pre- and post-Vatican II Catholic education. My
primary grades were spent under the tutelage of nuns. The atmosphere
was not far removed from the tragicomical worlds of Christopher
Durang and Mary Gordon. I regard those times fondly. Whenever
asked to recall influential teachers, I always remember Sister Angela
Bulla for challenging me and making me think. After grade school, I
attended Christian Brothers Academy, a Catholic high school. The
clear message the Brothers gave us from the beginning was: "Remem-
ber all the stuff the nuns taught you? Well, forget it." Implicit in that
command was a directive to question what they the Brothers would
teach us as well. They made us question dogma and assumptions, in-
vited us to rely on our consciences for moral decisionmaking, and en-
couraged us to forage freely in all intellectual fields. I recall teachers
like Brother Richard, who opened up the world of drama, and Brother
John, who drove a group of us to Manhattan to attend a Fellini film
festival. Brother John also tutored us in advanced calculus. I also re-
member Brother Bernadine, who told us to read Sartre after harangu-
ing us for not knowing who Sartre was or why Sartre turned down the
Nobel Prize. Clearly, this was not the stuff of the Baltimore Catechism.
It was the foundation for a lifelong intellectual challenge. At the time,
I was not fully aware that the journey was continuous. Instead, I as-
sumed that at some point the fields of inquiry would narrow, and that
the narrowing would start in college.
I spent four wonderful years at the University of Notre Dame
where I must say, to my embarrassment, that formal education was
wasted on my youth. During my first two years, I found the courses
slightly less demanding than my advanced high school courses, which
naturally led me to pursuits other than my studies. When I did study, I
concentrated on anything but the assigned texts. Although I would give
the assigned readings the once over, when examination time came I
read related subjects, or subjects in a related field. When I went to the
library, I told myself that I was constitutionally incapable of sitting in
a carrel doing assigned work; instead, I wandered the stacks. That wan-
dering through the library paid off in my last two years, when I began
choosing interesting courses instead of required ones. One of those in-
teresting undergraduate courses, called The Common Law, was taught
by my mentor and fellow commentator, Thomas Shaffer.
Even though I found that law school required more discipline than
had Notre Dame, I carried on in my tradition of intellectual wander-
ing, and occasionally found myself comfortably ensconced in some cu-
bicle reading jurisprudence or the autobiographical war stories of trial
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lawyers. I also supplemented and complemented my law school courses
with clerkships. These part-time work experiences were valuable ways
of integrating theory and practice.
There was no hidden method to my learning madness. Rather, I
suffered (or enjoyed) an undisciplined, roving mind. That love of in-
quiry may be the most important characteristic that impelled me to
teach law. I often felt, and still feel, the schizophrenia of being too
theoretical to be a practicing attorney and too practical to be a scholar.
As Professor Levinson notes, how could I turn down a job that paid me
to read, write, and talk about the things I like? I look back on my
Catholic (and catholic) education with great fondness. The memories
are funny and sad and their recollection evokes the bittersweet feeling
of lost innocence. I do not intend this essay to take an overly confes-
sional or apologetic tone (a noble, Catholic tradition); my remarks are
limited instead to my intellectual loss of innocence.
My formal education, from grade school through law school, is
best described as a period of roving among library stacks, searching
through bookstores, and attending diverse lectures. I felt more like an
intellectual guerrilla than a trained soldier. This feeling was something
of an anomaly for a kid with a scholastic education. If I did not come
away from this education with a disciplined mind, I did come away
with a sense of inquiry. That sense of inquiry had two dimensions. One
dimension was its intellectual pluralism: everything from particle phys-
ics to zen looked like fun. The other dimension was a healthy skepti-
cism that made me realize nothing contained the answer, and that the
search was the thing.
Healthy skepticism was about as far away from both cynicism and
true belief as I thought I could get. My intellectual or philosophical
mindset consisted of the following precepts: (1) question dogma; (2)
invest in the intellectual search; (3) beware of false intellectual idols;
(4) judge modestly; (5) give allegiance to no single principle; (6) avoid
despair; (7) be generous of spirit; and (8) maintain hope.
Those intellectual beatitudes are both ideals and aspirations.
Hopefully, I will not be faulted too severely for not attaining them. I
should, however, be faulted for not striving towards them. Read to-
gether, the beatitudes make a curious statement about Truth. The
healthy skeptic does not deny the possibility of competing versions of
Truth, nor does the healthy skeptic regard Truth with a relativism so
expansive as to render Truth meaningless and judgment or action im-
possible. Instead, the healthy skeptic admits that he or she does not
know Truth to a certainty, and is willing, if not compelled, to entertain
other interpretations.
This view of Truth has a direct application to law. Borrowing from
John Rawls, the American philospher and political theorist, if truth is
the end of thought, then justice is the end of social institutions like law.
Justice then, like Truth, may not come neatly packaged in one unalter-
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able variety, desirable as that might be. Instead, different versions of
Justice exist. There are historical and cultural, as well as epistemo-
logical and intellectual, reasons for the variations. Law does not neces-
sarily lead to Justice. Law, however, has the capacity to aid us in at-
taining Justice, if we let it.
The healthy skeptic has faith that law can serve Justice. That faith
is buttressed by hope that law will do so. Faith and hope in law are
tempered by reason and the realization that law is not by itself the
summum bonum. Manmade law, as Thomas Aquinas recognized, is ei-
ther just or unjust. Law can have a noble end. Attaining (striving for)
Justice is our responsibility if we choose it.
A crucial shift was made in the last sentence. Justice through law
comes about if those of us engaged in law teaching and lawyering
choose to see Justice as the end of law. Law is not an autonomous
construct dispensing Justice. Choosing Justice as the goal of law does
not eliminate the possibility that Justice can also be the object of those
who criticize law's role as a social institution. There is no logical or
compelling reason that says we must all believe in the same conception
of Justice. Everything in my training leads me to reject such a rigid
interpretation.
As applied to law teaching, this attitude means that intellectual
inquiry about law, with Justice as its object, allows the freedom to
read, write, and talk about ways of using law to make society more
just. Those were my views of law when I began teaching, and I had a
specific self-education project in mind. I set out to master a substantive
area or two of law, to attain a certain technical competence, and then
to elaborate on the socio-political consequences of this conception. I
thus hoped to develop a theory of law that would provide a background
for examining substantive topics. For a few years, the project worked.
As a teacher, I grew in confidence in the classroom; as a thinker, I
began to feel comfortable with my subjects and arrogant enough to
publish my thoughts about law, lawyering, and legal education.
III. SOMETHING HAPPENED: THE INDETERMINACY OF LAW
With due acknowledgement to Joseph Heller, something hap-
pened. My faith and hope in intellectual inquiry and my healthy skepti-
cism gave way to the dark night of the soul that Levinson refers to in
his essay. Again, let me use a personal example.
A colleague, a Jesuit priest also trained as a lawyer, taught law
school for many years until one day he decided he could not go into the
classroom. Here was a teacher who could parse an opinion with Oc-
cam's razor sharpened to its finest edge. His breadth and depth of
knowledge was typical of someone with his scholastic education and
training. He also had the Jesuit hubris that makes teaching an easy
chore. Yet something happened. He began to fear the classroom. When
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I asked him why, he answered that he could not face the students'
questions. He felt silenced. He had nothing to say. He had nothing to
teach. His only recourse was to depart the academy, which he did. The
silence was deafening. He had devoted much of his life to this branch
of his vocation, only to cut it off in one courageous act.
I cannot say I share that experience to the depth my late colleague
did. But I can say I have peered into the intellectual abyss of the law,
and have been standing for some time looking over its edge, unsure
whether to walk away or take a leap of faith into the void.
The precise experience is harmless enough. It is, however, sym-
bolic of a state of intellectual doubt, discomfort, and potential despair.
One semester not long ago I was teaching what I thought was the best
contracts course of my career. Almost everyday the class proceeded
smoothly, the discussion was continuous and wide-ranging. We ex-
plored legal method, doctrinal analysis, economics, feminism, Critical
Legal Studies, and liberal politics, all in appropriately modest doses.
Almost every class ended with a question that set up a discussion for
the next day. At no point did I feel unsure of the course's direction.
Then one day, during the discussion of a case, the students analyzed a
rule with frightening predictability. One student stated the decisional
rule, another gave a counter-argument, the next presented a brief eco-
nomic analysis, and another contributed a political overlay covering the
rule and the policy behind it. After that tour of the case, we fell silent
and moved on to the next topic.
I left class disturbed by the predictability of it all. I had heard tie
arguments before, because I had taught them. I was also disturbed by
the silence. There was no resolution to our discussion. Was I to enjoy
this indeterminacy and take Kingsfieldian pride in exploring the con-
tours of an issue without hinting at a correct answer? Was I to rejoice
in the brilliant training I had accomplished? My students could dissect
a case at several levels. Did this not accomplish what I had set out to
do, namely, explore legal method rather than doctrine? Was I not one
of the teachers who refused to "lay it all out for the students"? I must
confess that those were my goals, and they were also my conception of
good law teaching. Yet, I felt uncomfortable. There was no apparent
end to it all.
The training or, pejoratively, the indoctrination I just described
consists of exposing students to "thinking like a lawyer." This thinking
consists of inculcating in students a capacity to play with law. To be
sure, there is play within the rules of law. At some point, however,
there is a hard edge to this game when play becomes manipulation.
We, through our teaching, show students how to manipulate facts and
rules. From there, students learn to manipulate policy arguments and
jurisprudential schools of thought. I also suspect that, with the popular-
ity of the Alternative Dispute Resolution movement, students will soon
become adept at manipulating decisionmaking processes. To what end
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do we manipulate? Is law so susceptible to manipulation that anything
we say about the ends of law is meaningless or capable of being contra-
dicted? Moreover, if law is so indeterminate, are teachers even capable
of teaching students discernment? Do we develop their capacity to
make judgements? Put another way, do we teach students how to use
law, or how to live a life in law?
The answer to the last question is that teachers cannot help but
influence students. More often than not, we do this by example instead
of explicit articulation. I wonder, though, how conscious we are of the
silent symbols and subtle messages we send our students about the
right and wrong, good and bad ways of practicing law. I wonder how
reflective we are of the way our values infuse the learning process and
how our faith in, and doubt about, law affects our students. If we aban-
don our faith and hope in law, and if we fail to confront our doubts
about law's capacity for Justice, what kind of training are we giving to
our students? It is important to me that any faith we have in law must
not be reduced to simple catechisms. Instead, our teaching must con-
front our doubt.
As teachers in a professional school, we must realize that we are
involved in training students to make choices in an imperfect and some
times evil world. Law can be used to do bad things. South African
apartheid, Third Reich genocide, and American racism and sexism are
testaments to the evils and injustices perpetrated under law. The civil
rights movement, the women's movement, even the anti-war movement
are countervailing examples of the struggle for Justice under law.
Clearly, law has the capacity for good and evil. But what are we to
make of this?
When I admit my doubt about law's ability to serve Justice, the
intellectual beatitudes of my formal education and my healthy skepti-
cism give way to modernist thinking. Faith and hope in the search for
Truth and Justice confront the realization that law is not coextensive
with either virtue. Indeterminacy, paradox, and contradiction replace
dogmatic assertions of belief in the virtues of law.
These attributes of modern thought claim respectability because of
their associations with recognizable philosophical schools. I like
Duncan Kennedy's tongue-in-cheek label "fancy theory," by which he
refers to phenomenology, structuralism, deconstruction, Marxism, neo-
Marxism, and the Frankfurt School. Yet, all is not fun and games.
Even when these fashionable schools are not engaged in the intellectual
trench warfare known as "trashing," modernist learning has an uncom-
fortable edge of cynicism and despair. Modernism exposes the myths
and meanings behind law and reveals the illusion that law is Truth and
Justice. But where are we left on our journey? The modernist vision of
the indeterminacy of law leaves little ground to stand upon in the
search for Justice.
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IV. RECONCILIATION
The personal anecdotes recounted earlier describe my loss of inno-
cence as the beatitudes of my formal education gave way to modernist
tenets. Can the beatitudes be recaptured in a way that celebrates
rather than denigrates modernist learning? Can they be recaptured in a
way that accepts the inconclusiveness surrounding the edge of the
abyss? I believe that the healthy skepticism of my early education can
be reconciled with modernist learning. The near cynicism of modernism
is tempered by a liberal tolerance of our existential world, allowing
faith and hope to exist alongside truth(s) and justice(s). My ambiguous
use of the plural and singular forms and use of the lower case are in-
tended as a recognition of the fact that law does not have a life autono-
mous from the people involved in its administration. Additionally, peo-
ple and their values vary. As lawyers and law teachers, we invigorate
law with truth and justice to the extent we wish. The responsibility is
ours to give law the conditions necessary to do good and avoid evil. We
can adopt Unger's Christian-romantic vision or Dworkin's view of law
as integrity just as easily as we can adopt some Marxian notion of law
as a tool of the oppressive classes.
Where, then, does this journey to the edge of intellectual inquiry
leave me? If more than one conception of the good (Truth and Justice)
exists, then how do we choose, and train our students to choose, among
them? How can I know the true and the good? Are all versions equally
acceptable? The quick, and not altogether irrelevant or objectionable,
response to the question of how to choose among numerous alternatives
is the answer the instrumentalist gives. Lawyers need only represent
their clients. They need not reconstruct the whole of Justice. After all,
the instrumentalist continues, the lawyer cannot act as judge and jury
as well as advocate and counsellor. If lawyers assume all of these roles,
then their advice and representation of clients will be distorted. Rather,
the lawyer is one cog in the machine of Justice, and with zealous repre-
sentation what emerges from that machine will be just.
This instrumentalist and positivist response is neither as relativistic
nor as neutral as it may appear. Furthermore, it does not necessarily
follow that the lawyer is nothing more than a hired gun and that law is
lethal, if neutral, ammunition. First, lawyers have responsibilities when
choosing clients and providing legal representation. Law is not self-exe-
cuting; it must be administered by people. Lawyers give law its shape
in the first instance by choosing clients and careers. Second, lawyers
have professional and ethical obligations to the system to make sure
that it runs fairly. The criteria lawyers use in choosing clients, con-
ducting representation, and maintaining the integrity of the technology
of justice do not require a commitment to a single, unalterable vision of
the just state. Instead, lawyers can disagree on the best possible world
view. I believe, however, that lawyers should not disagree about
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whether the end of law should be Justice. Lawyers should take respon-
sibility for achieving that end even when law fails.
In this regard, lawyers inject ethical and moral content into the
decisions they make when choosing and representing clients. Not all
choices, Charles Fried notwithstanding, are morally praiseworthy. It is
wrong to represent a guilty client by asserting an alibi defense. It is
wrong to churn fees. It is wrong to help clients harass others. It is ab-
surd to say that lawyers can choose clients and conduct representation
for any reason whatsoever. Representing someone only because they
pay is morally indefensible. There must be something more and there
almost always is. Civil clients need help understanding and working
through an impersonal bureaucracy. Criminal clients need help re-
sponding to the accusations of a state that has the power to use coer-
cive force against them. Lawyers in both instances have the training to
render the necessary help. The law, even with its open-endedness, exists
as a tool for the lawyer rendering assistance. The abstract set of rules
and procedures we call law do not dispense Justice; people do. As law
teachers who influence those under our charge, we must be sensitive to
our role as models. We can at least teach students the importance of
making sound, intelligent, and caring choices in the imperfect, complex
world of law.
My loss of innocence was a maturation process and a recognition
that I will not develop, or see the development of, the answer to the
problem of the one and the many. Protecting individual rights while
improving the quality of life in a democratic society is no easy task, but
Justice requires it. The struggle to honor the one while helping the
many is an evolving challenge. The Grand Unified Theory (GUT) of
law is no closer than the GUT of particle physics. Still, the failure to
find either Truth or Justice in law does not mean the search is either
irrelevant or absurd. It simply means the vision must be reinspired.
Once the reconstructed imagination entertains intellectual beati-
tudes in light of modernist learning, a picture emerges. Law is not com-
pletely autonomous. Consequently, what law does is not necessarily
Just. Although it is not wholly determined by the political programs of
the ruling class, neither does law exist apart from ideology. Law is not
Truth. Indeed, law can be used to excuse bad things. Law, then, is
political in the same way that society is political. Politics change,
changing laws until they reflect the political structure of the state. In
turn, law executes the political programs that emerge from the struc-
ture. Specifically, majoritarian political programs in the United States
are the result of pluralism. Our society relies on the structure of our
Constitution for the protection of individual rights. Most importantly,
there is an inevitable tension between the two pulls of majoritarianism
and individualism. Law may be incapable of ultimately resolving the
tension, but the tension is embraced as much as it is tolerated. Unlike
immovable restraints, paradox and contradiction present opportunities
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for social and individual growth and development.
The role of lawyers, and trainers of lawyers, is to recognize and be
capable of acting within a range of indeterminacy with the full realiza-
tion that paradox and contradiction exist but do not preclude action.
Teaching can take place with a sense of wonder, excitement, and chal-
lenge once the teacher abandons the uncritical posture. As teachers, we
can reject the demands of our students for rules and suppress our desire
for mastery, while we profess our faith in law's capability to serve Jus-
tice. That law is not always just does not negate its potential for
Justice.
The existential quality of intellectual inquiry requires constant mo-
tion and exploration through fields, topics, and issues. Modernism
stares us in the face: we can perceive it as a threat instead of a chal-
lenge, or as a continuing part of the promise of a scholarly vocation.
We can move past modernism and reconstruct the legal landscape, even
reimagine our vision of teaching if we wish. Law need not be the thea-
ter of the absurd. As teachers, we must hold two deep contradictions in
our careers. We must appear to our students as mistresses and masters
of law. We must appear as having a philosophy of education and law.
Simultaneously, we must appear uncommitted to particular philoso-
phies of law and education, not because by showing no commitment we
are "objective" and value neutral, but because the lack of permanent
commitment helps preclude us from stagnating, promotes flexibility of
mind and craft, and allows us to continue the intellectual journey with-
out betraying the search.
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